January 31, 2011
Pakistan predictions 2009 and now...
In 2009, I took a road trip across the Northeastern United States and asked friends at every stop for their opinion on what was likely to happen next in Pakistan. The predictions I heard were gathered into the following article, which was published on Wichaar.com in April 2009. I am reproducing that article below, followed by a few words about how things look to me now, two years later.
I recently went on a road trip across the North-Eastern United States and at every stop, the Pakistanis I met were talking about the situation in Pakistan. As is usually the case, everyone seemed to have their own pet theory, but for a change ALL theories shared at least two characteristics: they were all pessimistic in the short term and none of them believed the “official version” of events. Since there seems to be no consensus about the matter, a friend suggested that I should summarize the main theories I heard and circulate that document, asking for comments. I hope your comments will clarify things even if this document does not. So here, in no particular order, are the theories.
1. Things fall apart: This theory holds that all the various chickens have finally come home to roost. The elite has robbed the country blind and provided neither governance nor sustenance and now the revolution is upon us: the jihadis have a plan and the will to enforce it and the government has neither. The jihadis have already captured FATA and most of Malakand (a good 20% of NWFP) and are inevitably going to march onwards to Punjab and Sindh. The army is incapable of fighting these people (and parts of it are actively in cahoots with the jihadis) and no other armed force can match these people. The public has been mentally prepared for Islamic rule by 62 years of Pakistani education and those who do resist will be labeled heretics and apostates and ruthlessly killed. The majority will go along in the interest of peace and security. America will throw more good money after bad, but in the end the Viceroy and her staff will be climbing rope ladders onto helicopters and those members of the elite who are not smart enough to get out in time will be hanging from the end of the ladder as the last chopper pulls away from the embassy. Those left behind will brush up their kalimas and shorten their shalwars and life will go on. The Taliban will run the country and all institutions will be cleansed and remodeled in their image. 2. Jihadi Army: The army is the army of Pakistan. Pakistan is an Islamic state. They know what to do. They will collect what they can from the Americans because we need some infidel technologies that we don’t have in our own hands yet, but one glorious day, we will purge the apostate officers and switch to full jihadi colors. The country will be ruled with an iron hand by some jihadi general, not by some mullah from FATA. All corrupt people will be shot. Many non-corrupt people will also be shot. Allah’s law will prevail in Allah’s land. And then we will deal with Afghanistan (large scale massacre of all apostates to be held in the stadium), India, Iran and the rest of the world in that order.
3. Controlled burn: This theory holds that there is no chance of any collapse or jihadi takeover. What we are seeing are the advanced stages of a Jedi negotiation (or maybe a Sith negotiation would be a better term). The army wants more money and this is a controlled burn. They let the Taliban shoot up some schools and courts (all bloody useless civilian institutions anyway). Panic spreads across the land. People like John Kerry come to Islamabad and almost shit in their pants at the thought of Taliban “60 miles away from the capital”. Just as Zia played the drunken Charlie Wilson and the whole Reagan team for fools, the current high command is playing on.
5. Buffer state: a variant of the above theory holds that Punjab is the historic buffer of India. All sorts of invaders come in, fight over the Punjab and capture it. Then the peasants get to work. We might even convert to whatever barbaric ideology they have brought, but in time the peasants outbreed and outflank the invaders. In the end, the invaders become Indian and help us outbreed and outlast the next invading horde. We win by “assimilation and attrition”. I am not sure if this is an optimistic theory or a pessimistic one. In India, the two are practically the same anyway.
6. No one seemed to think that peace would break out soon. No one thought the “peace deal” is the end of the matter. Jihadi sympathizers regard it as a way for the Taliban to consolidate in Swat before the inevitable advance into new territory. Anti-jihadis regard it as a necessary break to buy time while the new FC is trained, or as a surrender, or as an army plot, but NOT as a peace deal that leads to any kind of stable peace by some direct route.
My personal opinion in 2009: The state is stronger than many people think. But it is grossly incompetent and the elite itself is split and infiltrated by jihadi sympathizers. It won’t collapse soon, but all problems will continue to get worse for the foreseeable future. A big drone offensive is coming and there will be much secondary fighting in Pakistan. But there is at least a 50-50 chance that Jihadistan will NOT be able to expand into the Punjab and Sindh (though much terrorism will surely happen). The army will be gradually purged of jihadis and will one day come around to being a serious anti-jihadi force, but it won’t be easy and it may not happen. If the army continues to have jihadi sympathies, then all bets are off and many horrendous scenarios are imaginable. The US embassy may know more than we do. On the other hand, their declassified documents make it clear that they are incredibly naïve and racist in their assumptions and tend to regard the people they have colonized as mildly retarded children; so there is a good chance they don’t know batshit about what is going on, but are able to present impressive looking PowerPoints about three cups of tea with Kiyani to their bosses back home.
So what would I change today? I think the general outline remains the same and my leftist friends remain convinced that the army has not changed its spots and is still maintaining its links with jihadists while playing a double game with the US. But I am going to go out on a limb and say that I think the army is now serious about making a deal with India over Kashmir (both countries keep their current borders but allow free movement and trade across the existing line of control) and has put its jihadi dreams into very deep cold storage. But while their priorities may have changed, their propaganda narrative remains stuck in the same old anti-Indian, Jewish conspiracy mode. If anything, the usual “international Jewish-Hindu conspiracy” theory has become more entrenched. Whether the army seriously believes the old narrative is still useful, or whether this propaganda is now mainly used as a smokescreen to protect GHQ’s commanding position in national discourse while changing course below the radar is not clear to me.
Meanwhile, the domestic political picture remains confused and governance and corruption have gone from bad to worse. The PPP and the PMLN have cooperated more than most people imagined possible and the political class as a whole has done better than their terrible media reputation would suggest, but they have not been able to raise their performance to any significantly improved level. Inflation and poor economic performance have made the lives of the poor even more painful and elite corruption is as bad as ever. So while the deep state may not be on its previous suicidal Jihadist path, they risk becoming irrelevant if they do not improve governance and economic management fairly quickly. It is concievable that if some new economic disaster hits, then the ruling elite may face a very serious revolt. In addition, blasphemy and other such distractions remain potent tools in the hands of the religious right and it is possible that the army may lose control of the Islamists and the Islamist insurgency could spread deeper into Punjab. Still, if I had to make a guess one way or the other, I would say that the state will survive in more or less present format and while terrorism will continue, the existing system may still become reasonably stable. This is not saying much, but may be better than the alternatives.
Finally, I would add that this narrative is obviously politically incorrect and does not make too many allowances for liberal sensitivities. e.g. I do not write as if all evil is due to powerful White people and the innocent Brown folk will return to a state of nature once imperialism pulls out its oil-soaked fangs. That is not because I consider the imperialists to be necessarily good, but because I do not regard everyone else as lacking in agency. More on that next month, but if this narrative seems distant from the Imran Khan view of recent history, you can check out some of my reasons here.
Posted by omar at 12:35 AM | Permalink






















Comments
And no mention of population overshoot, ecological destruction, fundamentalism and superstition and illiteracy?
This sounds like the Austrians in 1913 arguing who their next Habsburg Ruler will be.
Posted by: Dave Ranning | Jan 31, 2011 10:27:47 AM
Dave, It is very rare to see population overshoot and ecological destruction as primary issues in politics...they effect all politics, but their effects play out through the surface phenomenas of politics, not so much as the direct topic of discussion.
Superstition is a given in any human society, but in more modern societies the professional elite keeps superstition at bay. Sometimes, just barely. But that is something all third world societies have to contend with. Its not unique or particularly bad in Pakistan.
And illiteracy is not the terrible scourge of democracy it is sometimes projected to be. The biggest problems in Pakistan have not been caused by illiterates, but by the semi-literate military leadership and political elite.
Fundamentalism is, to some extent, a phenomena in all societies. But it has been systematically encouraged by a section of the elite as part of some crazy notion of defeating India and distancing Pakistani identity from its Indian roots. Add to that the influence of Saudi oil money and its a perfect storm in Pakistan...but it will need another post to discuss that.
Posted by: omar | Jan 31, 2011 12:03:24 PM
Omar, that's superb -- that armed semi-literates pose a greater threat than mere illiterates could ever do. Oh, to fit it onto a bumper sticker. I'll look forward to the next post.
Posted by: Elatia Harris | Jan 31, 2011 12:26:24 PM
Oh yes, all is hunky dory because we had Miss Pakistan compete in a beauty pageant. I never would have imagined.
Posted by: Nusrat Bokhari | Jan 31, 2011 6:54:29 PM
Omar, this is a good post but only a starting point. Everyone who observes Pakistan understands the situation is highly unstable and volatile but there is very little structured discussion about what will lead to semi-equilibrium even if it is after violent convulsions. People are starting to talk about a Tunisia-style revolution but I see few parallels with the Middle East. This kind of scenario mapping is helpful in gaining greater understanding. It needs to go further however. Scenario 1 or 2 which are the most likely in the near term are only the first steps but they are not mutually exclusive from eventually 4 or 5 happening in some form. What happens when economic pain continues to get worse which it inevitably will. How will that affect neighboring powers like China and India. I just think the instability post-Taliban or Jihadi general control doen't decrease significantly enough for there to be an equilibirum for any considerable length of time.
This entire line of thinking requires more discussion but you have started it well and I look forward to next month's post.
Posted by: Fawad | Jan 31, 2011 8:08:57 PM
I have a prediction. It will be discovered that Pakistan doesn't actually have a nuclear bomb.
Posted by: Luke Lea | Feb 1, 2011 12:44:42 AM
"Nature has always had more force than education."
--Voltaire
And Pakistan is not remotely survivable, and until this is confronted directly, we will have political masturbation fulfilling the fantasizes of the educated elite.
Posted by: Dave Ranning | Feb 1, 2011 1:46:02 AM
Nice post Omar...refreshing to see such optimism.
Posted by: Troy | Feb 1, 2011 1:50:20 AM
i enjoyed this article immensely, not necessarily for its content, which is interesting, but for its style. whiffs of oral history, scenario modeling and the narrative structure of mythology.
also for the voice, a kind of hardened humor that must protect the self in the wake of an array of social institutions in which it can only furtively rest, before having to make its lonely way forward alone.
i'm sorry for the cliche, but i think this is one of the reasons for the recent flowering of pakistani writing: authorial autonomy at large within a global diaspora.
Posted by: Aditya Dev Sood | Feb 1, 2011 4:17:11 AM
Omar,
I enjoyed your crisp, no-nonsense analysis of the situation in Pakistan. I look forward to the next installment!
Let's hope that those who have some influence know what horrors await if sane choices are not made...
Thanks!
Posted by: Bill | Feb 1, 2011 6:17:33 AM
Beautiful article from a very sad situation
Posted by: Mirel | Feb 1, 2011 10:36:38 AM
Nusrat, where in the entire article does it imply that all will be well because a Pakistani girl participated in a beauty pageant?
The pictures, btw, are not illustrations of particular positions. They are Rorschach blots...
Posted by: omar | Feb 1, 2011 10:39:41 AM
On another blog, this elicited the comment that I am too focused on the army/ISI. My reply was:
My tunnel vision (and there IS some) is based on this line of thought:
1. There are similar problems in many previously colonized third world countries now dealing with social change, demographic pressures, economic problems, inequality, oppression, etc etc.. In this sense, Pakistan is little different from India or Bangladesh or Indonesia and many of the same issues need to be debated (and solved). I fairly regularly bring them up (see posts about politics, police reform, blasphemy law, education, history teaching, separation of mosque and state, participatory democracy, socialism, capitalism, etc etc)
2. But its true that I do focus a lot on the army/ISI factor and the reason I focus on the army and its jihadi dreams so much is because that is the one LARGE factor in which we are different from all similarly placed countries. Unlike India, or BD or Indonesia or even Myanmar, OUR army is unique in that it has systematically encouraged, recruited, trained and armed its own executioners. It has played a huge role in undermining civilian governance and it has stunted and distorted the political culture. It has systematically encouraged a very anti-Indian and irrational view of our identity and worked hard to prevent rational relations with India, which has led to rather special cultural and economic problems. All these problems exist over and above the mess that any poor, colonized, underdeveloped and unequal society would face in any case. They make our case especially difficult when it would be difficult enough if we were just an Islamic-democratic version of India.
If the army does not manage a complete reversal of this program then all other changes in Pakistan tend to get overshadowed by this issue. The existence of a separate, secret and unaccountable agenda in the largest institution in the country obviously distorts all political calculations. The perception that the army is still in cahoots with some terrorist groups makes it unlikely that we will see rational relations with India or Afghanistan (or Iran, for that matter). The fact that the army is playing its own games is, in short, a very serious impediment to reasonable progress in Pakistan. When and if this factor is corrected, we will NOT be in paradise. We will still have to deal with a thousand other problems. But its hard to get those problems solved in any country, its doubly hard when the country's own army is working at cross purposes to the political class.
having said that, I am now optimistic that the army is actually changing course. But it is doing so under pressure and to maintain pressure, everyone must highlight their previously stupid course or they will go back to it....
Posted by: omar | Feb 1, 2011 1:21:18 PM
Vivek Tandon
For me, from a distance [in India], the vital question is: How close is Pakistan to the point where where an Islamist lynch mob mentality is so wide-spread [including amongst the police and troops] that to demur from it means that you WILL be lynched [by someone like Qadri] even if you are President/Governor/Army Chief etc.
I would imagine that the Army would do all in its power to prevent such a state of affairs from coming to pass ... but I have come across no reports to that effect so far.
If that point is reached, rule of the lynch mob becomes unstoppable. A lynch mob armed with nukes ...
Posted by: Vivek Tandon | Feb 2, 2011 2:35:58 PM
Vivek, The army is united and disciplined at this point, but the jihadist faction is kept in check partly by giving in to them on issues that they consider non-negotiable. This is one of those issues. The army high command thinks it can ride the tiger while gradually weakening the tiger. THey may not succeed because they dont trust secular parties and forces and continue to work against them, and because their anti-Indian hysteria is still strong enough to cause them to give a pass to many otherwise totally insane groups. Its not a stable situation. But until this point, my impression is that they still think they can use the lynch mob without falling victim to it...and in the short term, they may be right.
Where does that leave my "optimism"? I dont know. I am optimistic on principle (on the principle that all liberals suffer from excessive pessimism and a tendency to panic, so if I feel pessimistic and panicky, I am probably wrong). But two recent blasphemy prosecutions (a student in Karachi and a clinically insane person in South Punjab) may point towards interesting times as far as the lynch mob is concerned (and economic crisis can cause an explosion without any lynch mob being involved)...
Posted by: omar | Feb 2, 2011 4:21:11 PM
Omar, By ‘this is one of those issues’ I’m not clear if you mean the blasphemy laws, or the trial of Qadri.
But it seems to me that Qadri’s trial is the door to the future: or, if the Army etc decide they can’t ensure the process of law for him, the trap-door to it!
I totally relate to your relationship with optimism & pessimism ... though perhaps from a different angle ... [sigh]
Posted by: Vivek Tandon | Feb 3, 2011 1:59:04 AM
I meant the blasphemy laws. About Qadri, I think they want him charged and sentenced. The army knows the implications of bodyguards shooting their bosses...
Posted by: omar | Feb 3, 2011 11:15:39 AM
Latest report: 'Judge defers Qadri indictment' ...
Posted by: Vivek Tandon | Feb 3, 2011 9:52:41 PM
Nice blog, and very sensible comments. My predictions; Pakistan will continue to muddle along for a while (less than a decade), and the collapse, when it inevitably happens, will be quick and bloody. The much-vaunted discipline of the Pakistani army is a shaky facade that will collapse in the face of the religious dogmatism of the militants. And the fear of nuclear weapons falling into their jihadi grasp will result in the international community taking allied action to keep this from happening; the result of which will be a break up of Pakistan into its constituent provinces. In the best case scenario, landlocked Punjab will manage to fend off the Taliban and keep its nuclear jewels on sufferance from the international community. In the worst case, Punjab will be forcibly occupied and its WMDs eliminated. Either way, the picture is not pretty but it is entirely the result of 70 years of mismanagement and very bad choices by the Pakistanis.
Posted by: Sam | Mar 29, 2011 4:09:57 PM
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