May 10, 2010
Let's Keep God out of Ethics
When did we hand over our moral autonomy - that is our ability to look critically for ourselves at moral dilemmas - to the lecherous hands and myopic vision of religious leaders? When did we say that we wanted guardians stationed in moral outposts, peering into the world with outrage-telescopes and hysterical megaphones? I certainly did not and I hope, regardless of your belief in god, you didn’t either. Ethical deliberation is something we all must face as part of our epistemic duty in this world, filled as it is with problems and a continuum of moral actions. To ask simply whether something is good or evil is often to trivialise ethical dilemmas: they are often not simply about choosing between right and wrong, but between two conflicting attitudes which are both apparently the right thing to do. Do we kill the fat man to save the lives of five others? Are we obligated to each sacrifice one kidney, which we don’t need, to save others who do? Do we give up eating meat, which we do not need for survival, to end the suffering of other animals?
These dilemmas are secular, in that anyone can come to them regardless of religious belief, and find in them a moral problem. However, with the blurring between morality and religion in today’s world, some “moral” problems become problems merely because of the arrogant bullying by religious groups who claim to “know”, better than the rest of us, what is moral. Homosexuality, women’s rights and abortion would most likely not be such hysterical moral dilemmas if not for tawdry metaphysical beliefs on the part of the believer. A good case can be made for any of these being moral dilemmas in purely secular terms, but it is unlikely that death or violence would ensue because of disagreement. The ferocity and vernacular of the dilemma would not be one spurred on by self-righteous believers who are defending god’s laws; or defending “babies” from evil, pincer-wielding doctors; or trying to maintain “family values” because of the “moral decline” in society. A lot of these dilemmas could be carefully deliberated upon in a safe, public platform, using the weapons of words and the shield of a podium, rather than bullets and knives to make one’s point felt. We have given into the worst reasoning to justify moral decisions, that is: raising your voice and making the loudest noise. And best of all if you can use god as a backing – since this still has moral force today, though it should not. Just because so many people are outraged by gay-marriage does not make it immoral anymore than everyone believing the earth flat would alter our planet’s shape. Turning something immoral merely because the majority view it as such is part of John Stuart Mill’s notion of 'tyranny of the majority'.
There is much appeal in wrapping oneself beneath a blanket of dogma and dismissal. It is, firstly, easy. Whether life starts at the moment of conception, whether deities are needed for morality, whether free speech has limits and if so how do we go about deciding, are all matters that can be thought of in secular – non-religious – ways. But, if you claim deified knowledge, there is no need for ‘hard thinking’; you can simply appeal to your own personal deity. Thinking about stem-cells and foetuses, cloning and euthanasia, are hard topics for anyone. People who specialise in these areas of applied ethics (doctors, philosophers, lawyers, etc.) will tell you of the vast tundra of conflicts that each of these landscapes reveal. So, if the average person were to enter these moral landscapes, the sheer vertigo of it all would be overwhelming: the depth of knowledge required, the sparks from conflicts which create light for further deliberation, the different areas that are touched upon, etc. Rather, before we can even open those gates, it’s easier to forcefully padlock them with god. Its ease means more people think they can participate fruitfully in the discussion, whereas this is not true at all. If you have no facts, you should do some deliberation of your own in attempting to understand the dynamics involved. Simply because you have a voice does not mean you should use it. Here, coherence with the loudest is confused with a valid argument. But this is a terrible reason to contribute. Unfortunately, and too often, society seems to take the loudest noise for the proper tune. We can find melodies in any amount of screaming but it does not make it music.
There is another more sophisticated reason. The notion that we create the rules of morality is simply terrifying. To know that these things we call ‘good’ and ‘moral’ are not passed down to us from some supreme knowledge-giver but created bottom-up from our mammalian minds is to see the wound before the flesh. It is an easier thought that there are absolute ‘good’ actions and absolute ‘wrong’ actions, since to mess up means you have simply strayed off the beaten moral path. It is hard when we realise that not obeying a moral rule does not necessarily mean we are wrong but the rule might be. This is one reason why those stationed at the outposts of outrage are often so fierce in defending things like the Ten Commandments, of God’s Laws, etc. The need to eradicate homosexuality, abortion and to treat life as absolutely ‘sacred’ (has there been a more rotten term in human history?) even if that life is coming to an end and suffering, is from their attempt to align morality with divinity. If there are no repercussions for straying from their god’s laws, what does that say about their god? If homosexuals can marry and live happy lives (they thankfully can), either my holy book is wrong about homosexuality, or my holy book’s understanding of morality is flawed. (Other possibilities might be that the Devil has won this round, our free-will cannot be usurped by god, etc. but they amount to similar justifications, hence their need to constantly raise their battering rams at the gates of liberty in any way they can.) When the faithful are unable to stem the tide of ‘immorality’, they need only wait for some natural disaster – an Act of God – to blame the homosexuals, the abortions, the rise of liberal values as the source for god’s discontent. Of course they must wonder why God sometimes takes out the holy quarters but spares the Red Light districts.
But they have answers for those too – working the usual mental-gymnastics characteristic of theological justifications. If the ideas of theology were people, many of them would be in cir-cuses as they contort themselves into any position imaginable. For example, the faithful would reply to the accusation that god took out churches instead of brothels by highlighting that this is actually a sign of his love; he is more offended by his worshippers failing (in being perfect subjects) than those non-believers who are not the targets of his salvation anyway. He has put much effort into these specific people and therefore he is more insulted by them biting the hand that celestially feeds them, than he is of those who dismissed his hand from birth.
It is also easy to assume that faithful know that our sinful actions will be met with punishment in the afterlife. But, they would not be the faithful if they were not attempting to see some redress in the current world. In an attempt to mimic their god, the faithful care about our most private actions, our most personal beliefs: do you prefer having sex with men or women? Are you married? Do you own pornography? The faithful must see these issues addressed as it fits with their attempt at making heaven on earth, a world free from sin, and therefore, of evil. Sin – remember not necessarily immorality – leads to evil. To eradicate sin is to eradicate evil. The attempt to do away with abortion, homosexuals, and so on, is their attempt to live in world free from evil, where nothing bad can happen. Of course, we do not live in such a world and never will, though the faithful do not believe it. Afterall, how can we have a merciful, loving god when there is so much suffering, like Hurricane Katrina? Easy: just blame the gays.
~
There are two reasons behind dismissing religion in general and theology in particular from ethics: 1) there is no reason to think religion, god, holy texts are necessary for morality (indeed, I think they are often retarding of ethical deliberation) and, 2) religion only clouds already diluted waters.Whatever moral benefits are to be gleaned from religious thought – ‘do not do unto others as you would not have done unto you’ (which Rabbi Hillel famously declared was the entire extent of the Torah), ‘love your neighbour’, etc., - these are beneficent to moral conduct regardless of a god watching. If one performs a moral action because of fear of Hell or god’s reprisal, then, according to most moral theories, one is not in fact being moral. In duty-based ethics, for example, the philosopher Immanuel Kant would claim that, for example, helping the poor for the sake of gaining entrance into Heaven – would be to treat these people as a ‘means’. For Kant, people were ‘ends-in-themselves’. Helping the poor should be done for its own sake of helping our fellow human beings, not because it will open the breaking doors of paradise.
Even if you are the world’s greatest philanthropist who donated his Rolls-Royce to charity, if you did it because you were scared of going to hell (as you main reason), you are not acting morally. This is to touch the surface of what constitutes acting morally in one particular moral theory, but it is obvious from this small example that morality is more than just watching out for sudden bursts of lightning and aftershocks of celestial laughter. Acting morally usually means treating people as persons, worthy of moral concern, and not for any more reason than that. Doing good, being kind, merciful, not hurting others – can all be easily understood by almost anyone, not only the religious. Indeed, the religious are often the ones who do not know what it means to treat others as people. They have no special claim to morality above and beyond the rest of us non-believers.
As professor of philosopher Mike Martin has indicated, a lot of moral theories all tend to cohere on fundamentals. The difficulty is in assessing which one is necessary for the current situation. They all, to take one instance, converge on treating people as persons: rational, moral agents worthy of moral concern. (What constitutes a person and why this is moral is more complicated, but continually fascinating for philosophers)
In an introductory textbook to applied ethics, Martin suggests one investigates all moral theo-ries, focusing on their strengths, weaknesses and developments, and, finally, apply the necessary clarification to the current moral dilemma. For example, if we have more patients than dialysis-machines, how do allocate patients? Those patients who do not receive dialysis will die; so, essentially, removing them from the list (or not putting them on the list) is going to kill them. Do we give it to those patients who would most benefit society, for example: doctors, scientists, etc.? Do we give it to younger people before older (for a powerful criticism of society’s horrible dismissive attitude to the elderly, see Raymond Tallis’ amazing Hippocratic Oaths)? By looking at different moral theories, we come to different but progressive conclusions. The point is that there is no objectively and absolute right answer. These are ways to clarify the position of the hospital’s own ethics, the constitution, the patient herself, etc.
The faithful are often certain that their particular god knows exactly what is moral. But the greatest philosopher, Plato, raised a challenge that has not been met, to any degree sufficient for religious moral sceptics (those who do not think morality comes from religion, which includes many religious people). Known as Euthyphro’s Dilemma, the moral philosopher James Rachels summarised it as follows: is a certain conduct right because the gods say so, or do the gods say so because it is right? You can swap ‘right’ for ‘wrong’, or even ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’. The point remains powerful. Let us bifurcate it in an effort of clarity.
1. A certain conduct, for example, killing babies, is wrong because god says so
2. It is wrong to kill babies, so god says so.
If 1, then it is arbitrary. If it is simply the case that whatever god dictates as right or wrong is right or wrong, then he could arbitrate anything he wants. As in the Bible, it dictates we should stone our non-virgin daughters if we discover her status on her wedding-night (Deuteronomy 22); we should kill our children for continued disobedience (Deuteronomy 21). These are in a Holy Book but are not performed today in modern civil societies. Nearly all Christians will tell you this does not apply now and, indeed, will say that it is wrong if it was done. They might mumble and hand-wring if these same things were done and were justified by the perpetrator according to their bible’s passages, but the point remains: the majority would most likely not accept stoning virgins and brats as signs of morality.
Which relates to 2. If it is wrong and then god says it is wrong, what use is god in moral deci-sions? If even god is subject to moral constraints in his decision, then there is no reason why god is necessary. It is wrong aside from god’s turning it really really wrong. It becomes no less wrong just because god says so. Murder is murder, and remains immoral (in most circumstances), not just because the Ten Commandments say so. (Indeed, Euthyphryo’s logic was recently updated and extrapolated by Christopher Hitchens as a challenge: Name an ethical statement or action, made or performed by a person of faith, that could not have been made or performed by a nonbeliever.)
The major reason we need to promote godless morality (like the amazing Bishop Holloway) remains neither about convincing people god does not exist, nor that their faith/god/holy book, etc. is poorly justified. It is not about saying nonbelievers are more moral than believers (I do not necessarily think so). It is about the best way to deliberate clearly and coherently about difficult topics, without these already murky topics being shadowed by the supernatural flights of dogma, beating its wings across the different moral tundra. By minimising the ecstatic fervour about moral matters in general, we can help prevent bullet-point arguments being met with bullet-riddled bodies.
UPDATE: Thanks for all the lively comments, both the kind compliments and the intriguing criticisms. Keep them coming. A special thanks to commentator David Evans for pointing out errors which are now corrected.
Posted by Tauriq Moosa at 12:26 AM | Permalink






















Comments
"Do we give up eating meat, which we do not need for survival, to end the suffering of other animals?" YES - and dairy, eggs, leather, wool etc etc - and not just to "end the suffering", but because there is no ethically legitimate way we can avail ourselves of these things. duh!
Posted by: cavall de quer | May 10, 2010 7:54:34 AM
This is an excellent article. Positing a mystery God in no way relieves us of the difficult work of deciding how we ought to live. Reason, experience, observation, and empathy must be our guides--not blind obedience to petrified religious opinions.
Posted by: NORM ALLEN | May 10, 2010 11:58:04 AM
Good stuff, but I worry about your characterization of both the average faithful person and of moral life in general.
First, the headline-grabbing nutters in the USA are outnumbered by a more interesting and subtle type of religious believer. You will find, if you look into it, that this believer's ethics are bound up very tightly in community and tradition. They are of course securely attached to God, but rarely does such a person find themselves acting or believing in a certain way simply because "it's in the bible" or because "they want to get into heaven". This is a gross mischaracterization of the phenomenon of religious ethics in much of the world.
As I say, their ethical life is tightly bound up with community and tradition. This leads me to my second point. You insist that above all else moral life needs clear-minded reflection, without the distraction of religious principles.
This model (of pure, unbiased reflection delivering the proper moral ideas) is Kant's, and it is rejected by many for a huge number of reasons. One of which is this: there is simply no such thing as thinking about ethics without already being immersed in a set of shared principles, ideas, emotional reactions, personal projects, etc. So, for your argument to work, you have to show why the secular person's core principles/ideas/projects are somehow less troublesome or "distracting" than the religious person's. I don't think you've done that, here.
Indeed, your main foe is an alternative view of ethics: one which takes phenomena like community, shared language and interdependence as basic to ethical life and ethical thought. If this view prevails, then religion (in its gentler, subtler form) emerges as a profoundly good framework for ethics, for it commonly serves as a shared, traditional story around which people can build communities, languages, and bonds between one another.
Posted by: Nick Smyth | May 10, 2010 1:45:38 PM
Thank you, Nick. It is good to see that so well articulated here.
Posted by: Zara | May 10, 2010 2:37:05 PM
Observations
One doesn’t have to fully agree with the views portrayed by the author of this excellent piece. Just that it succeeds in portraying the idea of a god independent from human values is enough for my taste.
Posted by: Felix E F Larocca MD | May 10, 2010 4:26:21 PM
Nick:
Indeed, your main foe is an alternative view of ethics: one which takes phenomena like community, shared language and interdependence as basic to ethical life and ethical thought. If this view prevails, then religion (in its gentler, subtler form) emerges as a profoundly good framework for ethics, for it commonly serves as a shared, traditional story around which people can build communities, languages, and bonds between one another.
Tauriq asks in the voice of Christopher Hitchens:
Name an ethical statement or action, made or performed by a person of faith, that could not have been made or performed by a nonbeliever.)
Nick, I agree with you that a sense of community, shared values, language and tradition are powerful ingredients that fuel our ability to reflect on ethics, morality and our ability to co-exist and co-operate harmoniously. Also true that religion in its subtler, gentler form has been the glue which has held communities together through centuries. The question that Tauriq asks is whether the time has come for us to consider if we can replicate the same values pertaining to community, tradition and shared narrative through a humanistic secular common ground where god / religion / heaven / hell are no longer the pertinent carrot or stick? Do we have the confidence to make that leap of "faith" based on our common humanity?
Posted by: Ruchira | May 10, 2010 11:45:44 PM
I discovered this blog entry 45 minutes ago and have been reading it and thinking since. I agree, it is an excellent article
But I particularly liked lasat paragraph of Nick Smyth's response and found it worth examining this liking, by writing:
Religious belief and religious systems and dogma are not inherently evil, nor necessarily a morally inhibiting flaw in humantiy.
At the heart of the matter here is a question that you rarely hear asked: WHY has humanity so often made recourse to religion?
Assuming here that we discount the existence of the supernatural, then the answer easiest to leap at is something the blogger claims. It is easier to cling to externally provided moral laws (particularly if they are deontological) than it is to work morality out for oneself in one's own environment.
This argument is weak. it ignores one of the golden rules in philosophical inquiry: the "principle of charity". When one is attempting to critique another's views or argument, we ought not just assume that their claims are based merely on some mistaken notions. Rather, we ought first assume that their claims are based on sound notions, even though these may not immediately be apparent to us. We ought seriously attempt to deduce our opponents strongest possible argument. Even if our opponent happens not to have discovered this strongest argument, if it is sound, then our easily found objection, such as the one above, cannot stand. For even if our opponent presents us with only a weak argument, it will be compatible with this strongest possible argument. Thus, if this strong argument happens to stand soundly, then the weak one can always be replaced by our opponent with the strong one.
The posted closing comments I've copied and pasted above show an insight that the blogger is deficient in. It is strongly likely that as some kinds of religious beliefs or practices may indeed be at least instrumentally useful in dealing with moral issues.
Indeed, if it so happens that such religion provides the ONLY path to certain moral resolutions, then the blogger's claim that religion is never necessary to morality falls.
Of course this last is the 60 million dollar question.
Notice that what Doesn't need to be raised is the question as to whether said religion is actually based on true belief, qua deities and so on.
Posted by: Jonathan Christie | May 11, 2010 12:04:58 AM
@Nick:
>>that this believer's ethics are bound up very tightly in community and tradition. They are of course securely attached to God, but rarely does such a person find themselves acting or believing in a certain way simply because "it's in the bible" or because "they want to get into heaven". This is a gross mischaracterization of the phenomenon of religious ethics in much of the world.<<
This sounds very confused. There are only two extremes with gray areas in between:
(a) you make your own moral decisions,
(b) your moral decisions are deferred to a real (eg. nature) or imagined (ie, evidence-free) moral authority, so you can disclaim responsibility for those decisions, often expecting major rewards from those authorities for following their position in those decisions.
Religious persons tend to cluster near (b), with the most devout nearest to (b). The author is talking about the harm in (b).
Also, if you are saying that the threats and rewards of an afterlife has zero influence on normal religious people, then you are also saying that religious people have no incentive to act better than the non-religious, other things being equal. Of course, other things aren't equal, and we see in the news that people made to believe absurdities are often also made to commit atrocities. (Just noting because some people want to have the cake and eat it too.)
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 1:23:06 AM
@Nick:
>>there is simply no such thing as thinking about ethics without already being immersed in a set of shared principles, ideas, emotional reactions, personal projects, etc. So, for your argument to work, you have to show why the secular person's core principles/ideas/projects are somehow less troublesome or "distracting" than the religious person's.<<
There is nothing to be shown if "religious" is defined as including the acceptance of a moral framework bound to tradition or revelation. Again, you seem to want to have the cake and eat it too. If no unquestionable traditional moral principle is involved in a person's religion, yes, she is not worse off than the non-religious. But that happens to be trivially false with most religious sects/people.
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 1:41:19 AM
@Nick:
If this view prevails, then religion (in its gentler, subtler form) emerges as a profoundly good framework for ethics, for it commonly serves as a shared, traditional story around which people can build communities, languages, and bonds between one another.
It must be easy to put on the rose tinted glasses and call for a gentler, subtler form of religion, when all you are advocating for are divisions based on organized, non-evidence-oriented disagreements between communities. I wonder at the reasoning that concludes that this is a good thing.
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 1:56:52 AM
Ruchira:
I very much agree that religion is not necessary for anything like a shared communal set of values. I was not arguing otherwise. Rather, I was arguing against the author's claim, encapsulated in the title of the essay, that religion necessarily impedes the ethical life.
Matthai,
I have no idea why you think that ethical thought or ethical life must be lived in terms of your (a) or your (b). Both sound like utter absurdities, to which only a tiny fraction of people could ever be attracted.
Listen to yourself: you are saying that religious people tend to disclaim responsibility for their actions. That is the sort of stereotype-claim made by vicious racists and genocidal maniacs, not by reasonable people with an interest in actually working things out.
Posted by: Nick Smyth | May 11, 2010 2:00:49 AM
@Nick:
I have no idea why you think that ethical thought or ethical life must be lived in terms of your (a) or your (b). Both sound like utter absurdities, to which only a tiny fraction of people could ever be attracted.
Thanks for the blatant strawman argument. I said those are the two extremes with shades of gray between them.
If you don't accept the continuum I proposed, why don't you point out an exception, a single one?
No, tradition, community and God all count as external moral authorities one may abdicate decision making and responsibility to, and people who do that are not exceptions.
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 2:15:08 AM
@Nick:
Listen to yourself: you are saying that religious people tend to disclaim responsibility for their actions. That is the sort of stereotype-claim made by vicious racists and genocidal maniacs, not by reasonable people with an interest in actually working things out.
If you cannot tell ideology and race apart, and know why condemnation of ideology and condemnation of race are incomparable, you are clearly beyond hope.
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 2:20:54 AM
@Ruchira:
Also true that religion in its subtler, gentler form has been the glue which has held communities together through centuries.
Religion's strength to hold communities together comes at a high price, namely the price of requiring the recognition and elimination of heretics one way or another to make it possible.
Religion demonizes the apostate; nationalism the unpatriotic; and civil society the law-breaker. All effective social glues require some form of policing, so we have to ultimately decide which social glues are worth the often-terrible costs.
This is to say nothing of the well-glued social group's treatment of the outgroup: the infidel, the foreigner, and the barbarian, respectively. Again, we have to consider whether the benefits are worth the cost.
Frankly, in my opinion, more than the other two examples, religion is not worth the cost, whether it is internal oppression of undesirables in highly religious societies or the blowing up of/Crusading against the external enemies of the One True Faith.
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 3:19:53 AM
That is a truly excellent post. I am in total agreement with the arguments. However there are some verbal slips you might like to correct. Not because they are sins (!) but they can be stumbling blocks. For example:
paragraph 2: "are obligated" -> "are we obligated"
para. 3: "spurned" -> "spurred"
para. 5 "'wrong' action" -> "'wrong' actions"
Para. 5 "they we" -> ?
Para. 7 "there attempt" -> "their attempt"
Posted by: David Evans | May 11, 2010 6:13:03 AM
Name an ethical statement or action, made or performed by a person of faith, that could not have been made or performed by a nonbeliever.)
I assume you mean other than prayer, miraculous healing, or salvation by conversion, but how about from the other perspective? Can you name some ethical statement or action, made or performed by an atheist, that demonstrably cannot trace its genesis back to a religious root?
Posted by: Carlos | May 11, 2010 8:41:37 AM
I can, Carlos. My daughter has never been taught one thing about or from, religion. She barely knows what's in the Christian bible. I myself have never given her any ethical or religious instruction. Yet I am certain that no one who has ever known her has anything but praise for her, or has ever had a dispute with her; she is never less than fair and as generous as she can be in business as well as in her family and personal life.
I rather doubt that I could convince you that she hasn't somehow absorbed something of this way of life from the world she lives in, but I know that this is the way she has always been; I no more taught her ethics than I 'taught' her hair to be wavy.
She would be bemused, I guess, by your challenge; not having been indoctrinated, she's blissfully confident that she should live her life by her own lights, and isn't susceptible to doubt in that respect. I, however, find it the height of sophistry.
Posted by: Alice de Tocqueville | May 11, 2010 10:59:22 AM
Not quite what I was after, Alice, but she sounds delightful. It's a little unclear how old she is. If she conducts business, she must be old enough to have exposure to the outside world, and yet you seem to be claiming total control over her exposure to the examples set by other people who may have been influenced by the standards for right behavior promulgated by religions. Did you raise her on a deserted island, by any chance?
But it wasn't a challenge, it was a request for specific examples.
Also, I seem to recall you were recently struggling over how to tell your family that you were pregnant and you were afraid your father was going to kick you out? Having already had grown children out in the world, you'd think you'd have been past that by now. Do you have honesty issues?
Posted by: Carlos | May 11, 2010 11:58:03 AM
Matthai
I apologize if I've actually misinterpreted you. Now that you've cleared things up, let's start with what you think the author is saying.
You are claiming that this piece is about "the harm in (b)", specifically in "deferring" moral decisions to an external authority for the sole reason that you expect some "future reward".
Yet, the title of the piece is "keep god out of ethics", containing such phrases as "we need to promote godless morality". Now, it seems fairly clear that the author is not talking just about fundamentalists, he is talking about religion, period. Nowhere in the essay do we find a qualification indicating that the target is "extremists" or fundamentalists, who, according to you, represent (b).
I am arguing against him because he seems to take the most extreme form of religious belief and use it to attack all forms of religious ethical life. He, and I, and you all agree that extremism is harmful. The question here is whether religion can be good for ethics. Do you have a position on that?
Posted by: Nick Smyth | May 11, 2010 2:14:11 PM
Nick Smyth:
I apologize if I've actually misinterpreted you. (emphasis mine.)
Very uh, cunning of you?
You are claiming that this piece is about "the harm in (b)", specifically in "deferring" moral decisions to an external authority for the sole reason that you expect some "future reward".
For all the apparent direct quotes (although I'm not sure I used the exact phrase "future reward"--I presume those are not scare quotes) from me, you still managed to get it wrong. I said they are "often expecting major rewards", which is miles away from claiming that they all do it "for the sole reason" of a reward.
Also, I did not say that fundamentalists represent (b), much less that people who do (b) are all fundamentalists or extremists. I used the word devout, by which I intended to indicate those who take religion seriously and believe what the official teachings of the church, the imams or the words of the Quran (as the case might be) have to say on moral decisions. Unless you consider all people who hold a moral opinion directly influenced by a religious authority to be extremists, I don't see how you can claim that I or the author of the blog are generalizing extremist views.
Of course, if I'm not to use the devout as a standard of what religion stands for, which people should I ask? The Christians who are doubtful that Jesus was God? The "Muslims" who don't care what the Quran says? The Catholic that thinks the Pope is an anachronistic joke? Then I might as well go slightly further and include outright apostates as well.
This was never about extremists per se--it is about anyone who doesn't bother to think on their own about an important moral question but instead chooses to leave it to ancient texts and modern interpreters of those ancient texts. Their numbers are not negligible even in the West to say nothing of the Middle East or other places, and they do hold meaningful rational discussion of ethics back.
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 4:30:36 PM
Carlos:
I assume you mean other than prayer, miraculous healing, or salvation by conversion,
Of course--delusions are not ethical statements.
Posted by: Matthai | May 11, 2010 4:38:18 PM
Carlos, it was my pregnancy with her that I described; I'm sorry that I may have given the impression that the experience was contemporaneous. And no, I didn't raise her on a desert island. But our immediate friends and community did tend to include mostly people who were not religious - 'hippies', artists and free-thinkers - who regarded children as persons in their own right with dignity of their own.
It would be preposterous, of course, to say that she's never encountered religious ideas; she had some playmates who invited her to go to bible studies, for instance, but she found it uninteresting. I left it up to her whether to keep going, and after about two sessions, she didn't continue.
Surely you can't believe that kindness itself, or honesty is solely derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition? That is one of the first questions I put to my catechism teacher, who explained that there is the 'baptism of desire', that is, the desire to live a good life, which can initiate a person into the 'body of Christ'. But I came to the conclusion that certain things are true, and if Christ said them, that's it's because they are true, and not the other way 'round.
Posted by: Alice de Tocqueville | May 11, 2010 7:56:57 PM
Of course--delusions are not ethical statements.
Is the aforementioned "principle of charity" really too difficult for you even to pretend to openmindedness? Ah well, I do appreciate your honesty. Even so, except for the penultimate one, these can certainly be ethical acts, whether or not a disbelieving observer can discern any benefit or whether there is in fact any benefit at all. In the last case, that of salvation through conversion, there is no doubt that many a poor sinner has improved his dealings with others by being "saved in Christ." Would you argue that the man who "saved" another and thereby cured him of his anti-social behavior did no good because he lied in so doing? Whether or not he believed he was lying? Delusion or not, the action was well meant and had a positive outcome, not that ethics need to be necessarily tied to good outcomes. Many well intentioned acts have had unfortunate consequences, but that can't make them unethical. It's all about intent.
Alice. I am quite certain I took the contemporaneousness of your out-of-wedlock narrative exactly as it was intended. It didn't ring true at the time, so I did not respond. I'm sure my appreciation for you making the decision you made is a grain of sand next to the mountain of joy you have in your daughter. Well done.
And no, I am not saying that any decent behavior can only come from a belief in the risen Lord. We were wonderfully well made from the start. Ethics seem a bit more complex that simple social good-behaviors. All higher life forms seem capable of that—it's simple genetic altruism, no mystery, and I don't believe what this post is really about. As I see it, ethics kick in where normal rules break down and serious thinking is called for, so again, atheist examples, please. I expect there would be some, but I can't seem to think of any.
Posted by: Carlos | May 11, 2010 8:59:14 PM
Matthai,
The question of how "devout" people live their lives is purely empirical. I do not think that either your characterization or the original post's characterization are accurate, because I've actually looked into this once or twice and found thing to be far more complex and interesting than the "deferring to ancient texts" model you offer.
The thing is, though, none of this really matters: the argument is about whether a religious ethic can be a good ethic. Tariq says no. The argument he offers suggests, as I think you do, that clear-minded, rational (+"evidence-based", no doubt) reflection by individuals makes for a good ethical life.
I say again, as I said in my original comment, that this model is both empirically and conceptually wrong. Empirically because no-one actually lives by it, and conceptually because it is a Kantian absurdity, as absurd as a triangle with four sides.
This is because questions about the good life or about obligations quite simply start with values. These values are not arrived at after a long process of rational deliberation, rather, they are a result of a long social-historical process, and of an individual's being a part of that larger society. The very idea of something being "valuable" outside of a social context is meaningless. Ethical reflection is therefore intimately bound to a community with a history, no matter how much we'd like it to be otherwise.
So, IF the argument depends on religious ethics impeding an ideal life that is not and can not be lived by anyone, then God emerges from it unscathed. The burden is on God's opponent, here to show how this alternative vision of an ethical life is supposed to even make sense or be possible for human beings.
I see from your tone that you are unlikely to be persuaded of these points no matter what I say. Nonetheless, I'm pretty sure that my counter-argument merits a response, either by showing what this individualist alternative could be like, or by arguing that atheism, within the communal model, remains superior.
Posted by: Nick Smyth | May 11, 2010 9:11:11 PM
Nick Smyth:
The thing is, though, none of this really matters: the argument is about whether a religious ethic can be a good ethic.
No. The argument is about whether the process of refining extant ethics is helped or hindered by religious influence. The ethics we have, religious or otherwise, are clearly not perfect. The plurality of religious ethics trivially means that they can't all be universally good or perfect, and secular ethicists are rarely arrogant enough to even claim perfection, unlike, say, a Quranic authority might.
Now, the question is whether the process of finding better ethics, or the process of finding a suitable moral position on a hitherto unknown moral question, is helped or hindered by having a religious moral authority. In practice this usually means an authority based on primitive holy books, but you'll probably object to the characterization. So I'll just say that the definition of a religious moral authority specifically excludes anyone who solely depends on secular evidence-based scientific positions to make their case and gain credibility. That should be damning enough: religion is not good for ethics.
Posted by: Matthai | May 12, 2010 7:22:58 AM
Carlos:
Is the aforementioned "principle of charity" really too difficult for you even to pretend to openmindedness?
As they say, I try not to open my mind too much lest my brains fall out. There are lots of evidence-free claims out there that I have no time for--regardless of any implicit argumenta ad populum involved.
Delusion or not, the action was well meant and had a positive outcome, not that ethics need to be necessarily tied to good outcomes. Many well intentioned acts have had unfortunate consequences, but that can't make them unethical. It's all about intent.
I doubt that this is what Tauriq or Hitchens meant by "ethical statement". I confess to being baffled by the wording too, but I put it down to some linguistic nuance that I, as a non-native English speaker living in India, might easily miss.
Posted by: Matthai | May 12, 2010 7:45:07 AM
I doubt that this is what ... Hitchens meant by "ethical statement"
Well we can be sure if faced with it he would certainly rephrase. How do you suppose we could structure the challenge to preclude any possible undesirable response?
Posted by: Carlos | May 12, 2010 9:20:13 AM
@Matthai:
You are perhaps not familiar with my take on religion. Having explained my position here numerous times, I was just too tired to repeat myself. You need not waste your breath in explaining to me the price we have paid to uphold religion as the central bulwark of human civilization. I am actually mostly on your side on this one.
Posted by: Ruchira | May 12, 2010 11:03:39 AM
Matthai,
the definition of a religious moral authority specifically excludes anyone who solely depends on secular evidence-based scientific positions to make their case and gain credibility
A religious moral authority excludes no-one? How can that possibly count against it?
I am going to state my point one more time (this will make four times, by the way), and if you don't respond to it, I am going to assume that you are simply preaching and not interested in getting to the heart of this matter. I will italicize it in order that you might see its importance.
In the ethical sphere, there is not, and cannot be, a person who [your words:] "solely depends on secular evidence-based scientific positions to make their case".
I would elaborate here, but I already have several times, so read above if you want supporting arguments.
I ask again why we are to reject religious ethics on the grounds that it interferes with a process that does not and cannot occur.
Posted by: Nick Smyth | May 12, 2010 2:22:34 PM
Between heaven and earth
Ronald Aronson on the false choice between god and science.
Posted by: Namit | May 13, 2010 12:58:51 AM
Nick Smyth:
>A religious moral authority excludes no-one? How can that possibly count against it?
Very funny. I'll rephrase what I wrote: Anyone whose ethics and credibility are entirely dependent on secular and rational arguments is, by definition, not acting as a religious moral authority. It follows that such religious moral authorities and their evidence-free premises have no place in a purely rational discussion on ethics.
Yes, I understand that religion, tradition and community feature prominently in rational discussions. But there is an important difference in the authority wielded by those entities in such a discussion--a difference similar to the distinction between theology and religious studies. i.e, in a secular discussion, theology is descriptive at best, but never prescriptive. In a rational discussion, dogmatic "revelation" is descriptive, but never prescriptive. In a scientific discussion, evidence-free premises are descriptive if at all relevant, but never prescriptive. Do you see the distinction? A secular, rational discussion on ethics cannot afford to give special privileges to any theology, while it can certainly make rational and scientific observations on theology, which process then becomes Religious Studies, a secular affair.
>In the ethical sphere, there is not, and cannot be, a person who [your words:] "solely depends on secular evidence-based scientific positions to make their case".
I see a number of possibilities here:
(1) You don't object to my rephrased version above. If so, fine.
(2) You believe that ethics are nothing more than the arbitrary dictates of a divine authoritarian. I.e., that something is moral or immoral only because the gods say so. That would certainly be an impediment to a secular, rational attempt to refine ethics, because it is clearly a form of moral subjectivism.
(3) You are an outright moral and/or cultural relativist. If so, consider my considerable contempt for your views expressed.
>I ask again why we are to reject religious ethics on the grounds that it interferes with a process that does not and cannot occur.
Assuming that you don't belong to the second or third categories above, and you still object to my rephrased sentence, you would be demonstrably wrong. The process of a secular analysis and refinement of ethics has been going on in the West for a very long time, at least since the Ancient Greeks. (Parallel movements elsewhere lacked the equivalent of the eventual Enlightenment Era of the West to rise to prominence versus religious dogmatism.) If gays are no longer killed in the West, no slaves held, women not treated as chattel, it is not because of a religious ethic, it is because of a long process of secular debate where no religion was allowed a free pass to bully and railroad the participants. The idea that there was never a secular rational process of refining ethics is as hollow as the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.
Posted by: Matthai | May 14, 2010 7:03:15 AM
Carlos:
Well we can be sure if faced with it he would certainly rephrase. How do you suppose we could structure the challenge to preclude any possible undesirable response?
I have not art enough, but I might say something like this:
"Name an ethical statement or action that a believer or an alleged god has made or performed that could not have been made or performed by a nonbeliever--with the caveat that no evidence-free claims about the capabilities or doings of either believers or alleged gods will be entertained."
Posted by: Matthai | May 14, 2010 7:22:19 AM
You are perhaps not familiar with my take on religion. Having explained my position here numerous times, I was just too tired to repeat myself. You need not waste your breath in explaining to me the price we have paid to uphold religion as the central bulwark of human civilization. I am actually mostly on your side on this one.
My mistake, it seems. Sorry about that, and I hope someone else may have bothered to read it too, so that it wasn't completely wasted. :)
Posted by: Matthai | May 14, 2010 7:31:55 AM
Nick Smyth:
This is because questions about the good life or about obligations quite simply start with values. These values are not arrived at after a long process of rational deliberation, rather, they are a result of a long social-historical process, and of an individual's being a part of that larger society. The very idea of something being "valuable" outside of a social context is meaningless. Ethical reflection is therefore intimately bound to a community with a history, no matter how much we'd like it to be otherwise.
I had charitably assumed that you were not a cultural relativist. Re-reading, I have to wonder: Are you? Is that a cultural relativist denial of objective/universal morality you are trying to express? If so, I shall duly pity your fashionable moral confusion and move on.
So, IF the argument depends on religious ethics impeding an ideal life that is not and can not be lived by anyone, then God emerges from it unscathed.
No, it depends on dogmatic religious ethics impeding the ever more secular and rational "long social-historical process" of refining ethics. Why do you assume that "a long process of rational deliberation" and "a long social-historical process" are mutually exclusive? Why can't a long social-historical process of rational deliberation by many rational secular philosophers produce superior ethics?
Posted by: Matthai | May 14, 2010 8:05:58 AM
Matthai,
I have never once claimed in this discussion that any cultural phenomenon or attitude has necessary authority of any kind. I (again...) have been making a very simple argument against the original post, an argument which has the following form:
1. The post claims that we have reason to reject God in ethics because God interferes with X.
2. X is conceptually incoherent.
Conclusion: Given only what has been said, we have no reason to reject God in ethics.
Where, in this line of reasoning, does cultural relativism occur?
The point I've been driving at is this: both fundamentalist-religious "deferral to text" reasoning and secular "evidence-based" reasoning are absurd. Between them lies a vast gulf of possibility (or should I say, "reality") encompassing how people actually can and do make moral decisions.
I do not know what the correct model is, or even if there is a correct model. What I do know is that whatever such a model is, it cannot rely solely on "evidence" from the sciences or on pure logic for its results. Your insistent refusal to engage with the sheer impossibility of that quasi-Kantian model is baffling. All discussions (of any kind) must begin with shared values, and values are not delivered to us by logic or by the sciences. They are prior to any such investigation.
Of course there can be a secular, rational discussion of ethics. But it can only exist in a context of shared values (commonly, those of liberty and equality) which are not derived from science or logic, but which are presumed from the outset (they are, in the words of a famous secularist, "self-evident").
The challenge for a secular ethicist is to show how those values are superior to others, not to just insist that "reason" and "evidence" win the day. If this is the only argument we have, then the religious ethicist has an extraordinarily easy retort: "You can't ask me to defend my (religious) values if you're not going to defend your (secular) ones."
Posted by: Nick Smyth | May 14, 2010 12:10:09 PM
Carlos,
I described my dilemma the way I did merely to give it immediacy, I don't think that changed the relevancy to the point we were discussing in that thread; the dilemma is the same. But I guess you meant it didn't ring true because a person in that position wouldn't be posting here, no? Also, I believe I mentioned that abortion wasn't legal then. So I can see why it didn't ring true to you.
I don't understand what you're asking in the rest of your response; can you give an example of what you mean by a situation that 'normal rules' or 'simple genetic altruism' doesn't solve?
Posted by: Alice de Tocqueville | May 14, 2010 12:25:56 PM
1. The post claims that we have reason to reject God in ethics because God interferes with X.
2. X is conceptually incoherent.
I'm still waiting for you to demonstrate how X (= a rational and secular process of debating and refining ethics) is conceptually incoherent.
The quick answer to the question of epistemology is that the claimed legitimacy of religious ethics is simply wrong. Not very difficult to picture--because of the plurality of religious ethics out there, only one can be right at best. At worst, all of them are wrong. Unless you are a moral relativist, you should have no problems saying that some of the conflicting world views are simply wrong.
Of course there can be a secular, rational discussion of ethics. But it can only exist in a context of shared values (commonly, those of liberty and equality) which are not derived from science or logic, but which are presumed from the outset (they are, in the words of a famous secularist, "self-evident").
Well, we have widely accepted working definitions of "health", which if you think about it, involves much arbitrariness. But we don't let that arbitrariness, or more properly, vagueness, to grow into relativism. We can do the same for human happiness or "Eudaimonia" too. There may still be those who claim that their idea of being healthy is being infected with cholera or that their idea of being ethical is stoning adulterers, but it is high time sane (another tricky word) people left these types of subtle relativistic tendencies behind.
If you still consider Eudaimonia to be a relative concept, I must ask you why you consider it relative while presumably not considering "health" as defined by the medical authorities (backed by reason and evidence), or "sanity" as defined by psychiatric authorities (backed by reason and evidence) to be entirely relative concepts. After all, it is possible that the Cholera-infected, the stoning party member and the insane all think that their states are respectively healthy, ethical and sane.
On the other hand, if we reach the conclusion that 'Eudaimonia' is not relativistic, then logic, reason, Science and evidence all have a role in the search for better ethics, the same way they play a role in refining our ideas of health and sanity.
Posted by: Matthai | May 18, 2010 6:24:46 PM
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