December 14, 2009
Look Who's Talking: The Turing Test's 3,000 Year History - And My Proposed Modification
In his famous experiment, Alan Turing pictured somebody talking with another person and a computer, both of which are out of sight. If they're unable to tell the computer from the human being, the machine has passed the "Turing Test." But here's a question for a human or a machine to answer: Why did Turing pick speech as his proof?
The Test is usually described as way to determine whether a computer has achieved consciousness, but Turing's original framing was more subtle. "I believe (the question of whether machines can think) to be too meaningless to deserve discussion," he wrote. "Nevertheless I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted."
Now, that's interesting: Not only did Turing choose good conversation as a valid substitute for proof of machine "thought," but he then added an implied proof - based on what people say. If people say machines "think," then they do think. If people say they're conscious, then they are conscious.
Why such an emphasis on speech - the machine's, and our own? The idea that language, words, and names are a measurement of consciousness goes back at least 3,000 years, to the Tower of Babel story from the Book of Genesis. "And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech," it says, "and they said ... let us build us a city and a tower ... and let us make us a name." You know what happens next: "And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one ... now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do." The great tower, that literal Hive Mind with its worldwide common language (HTML?), came crashing down. The lesson? Language and knowledge equal personhood, but too much equals Godhood.
People could create artificial life in the ancient texts, too - but their creations couldn't speak. In the Talmud, Rabbah makes an artificial man that looks just like the real thing, but a shrewd scholar - one Zera, who I picture as looking like Peter Falk in Columbo - administers a Turing Test and the creature flunks: "Zera spoke to him, but received no answer. Thereupon he said unto him: 'Thou art a creature of the magicians. Return to thy dust.'"
Flash forward to the 1600's and Descartes, who wrote in Discourses On the Method: "If there were machines which bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as closely as possible for all practical purposes, we should still have two very certain means of recognizing that they were not real men. The first is that they could never use words, or put together signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts to others."I don't know Descartes if read the Talmud, but he claimed to be religious and even wrote an ontological argument for the existence of God (if not a very convincing one). There's no question he read Genesis, as well as many other papers, poems, and stories derived from these ancient texts and legends.
Did Turing read Descartes? We don't know - but we can be pretty sure he saw another work: Boris Karloff's Frankenstein. The monster, who was eloquent in Mary Shelley's book, was mute in the movie. Whether or not the film makers were echoing these ancient stories, they'd undoubtedly seen the 1920 German film The Golem (see above), based on a folktale derived from the Talmud passage about the wordless "man" made of dust. The Golem story spread in the shtetls of Eastern Europe during the 18th Century at the same time the Frankenstein story was written. They may both have stemmed from the same fear - that humanity's industrial advances were bringing us to a new Babel even as new medical discoveries invaded God's turf.
I'm not a big fan of the Turing Test (which is analyzed in detail here). I'm sympathetic to the Chinese Room argument that you can replicate speech without creating the sentience behind it. I lean toward the idea that most speech is just an output for the human species, the way honey is for wasps or webs are for spiders. My first mother-in-law could weave something that looked like a spiderweb, if you asked her nicely, but that didn't make her an arachnid. So if we build an AI - or meet an alien, for that matter - that can speak like a human being, I still won't be completely convinced it has consciousness like ours.
Which gets us to singing. Its main evolutionary purpose seems to be attraction - either sexually, or as a way of establishing trust. Daniel Levitan suggests that singing might have been used to convey honesty when a stranger approached a new community, because the emotion conveyed is more difficult to fake. Maybe that's why Bob Dylan's more popular than Michael Bolton: It's easier to lie with words than music, and the successful transmission of emotion is more important to us than the sweetness of the voice.
So I hereby propose a modification to Turing's test: Instead of asking our entity to speak, let's ask it to sing. If it can make us cry with a sad song, we'll say that it's conscious. And if it can get us aroused - with, say, a new version of "Sexual Healing" - well, then let's just say our experiment could take an unexpected turn.
It's true that all of the arguments against the Turing Test could also be used against this one, so it doesn't really advance the debate very far. But what the hell: At least we might hear a decent song for a change, instead of all the crap they've been playing lately.
Posted by Richard Eskow at 12:02 AM | Permalink






















Comments
Good grief.
Bob Dylan is popular because people have very little taste, and further, half of them (plus) populate the left-to-center portion of the Gaussian, where his simplistic, self-absorbed messages are taken as complete truths. One might as well say that Paris Hilton is popular because [insert ridiculous rationale about poetry, singing, or emotion here.] No. She's popular because a very large number of people are low performers - and so is she. They're simply members of the same flock, as it were.
Bob Dylan can't sing, is a lousy "poet", and as an instrument playing musician... doesn't even reach the bottom of the scale.
Leo Kottke is a far better instrumentalist.
The virtual committee who write for Amy Grant are better poets.
And anybody outside of Tom Waits can sing better than Bob Dylan can. Tom Waits, of course, cannot be sung worse than, even with physical injury and threat of death involved. Tom Waits defines the bottom of singing performance like absolute zero defines cold.
And as for emotion being more difficult to show when singing as compared to daily life... where's you data? Cite, brother, cite. It's a structured acting venue, which you get to practice as much as you like before you are judged (all the more reason Dylan qualifies as a stinker.) I don't think your assertion has a leg to stand on.
And yes, I'm a musician. :)
Posted by: fyngyrz | Dec 14, 2009 5:38:50 PM
Dylan was never known as more than an adequate guitar player for his Guthrie-influenced music. He is, however, a much subtler singer than you credit him for, fyngyrz, mainly because of his rhythmic approach. You doubt this? Go ahead, try to sing along with one of his records. I can't do it, and I'm a passable singer. He consistently comes in sooner or later on a word or emphasis than I expect, because he's not right on the nearest eighth or sixteenth, he's coming in on 32nds and 64ths. Very subtle syncopation.
I do not accept the Chinese room argument, preferring the Hofstadter/Dennett objection, i.e. the systems approach. The man in the Chinese room doesn't understand Chinese, but the system as a whole, keeping up a conversation in Chinese, does understand Chinese. It's generally considered polite to assume other people have real minds even if you know how various parts of their brains work, eh wot?
This is not meant to excuse naifs who think Eliza or an automated phone system can pass the Turing test. (I deal with one of these on those rare occasions when I call in sick. "I think you said three thousand hours. Is This correct?" "NO!" *groans*)
We can picture a system which would pass this sort of Turing test, that is to say badly, and hook it up to Band-in-a-Box and Antares Autotune, with some randomizers to give it "soul." Let's face it, the Turing test as we understand it is a crude instrument, a thought experiment that predates transistors, miniskirts, and yes, Dylan.
What are we really trying to detect with the Turing test anyway? We can already make a machine that will spit out vaguely convincing strings of words, and we are listening past that to see if there's a thinking being behind it. But the prototype, homo sapiens, is a monkey running old layered circuits (analog, not digital!) with various automated thermostats at the core, a layer of ancient sensory and emotional equipment over that, another layer of processors to keep track of monkey social networks in constant flux, and atop all that, a layer of circuits for signaling and symbolic thinking, which we've hardly had long enough to really learn to control. It may be that the only way to get a machine to really act like a thinking being is to build it in imitation of the prototype. And even then it may not work well.
Posted by: Tom Buckner | Dec 14, 2009 7:28:45 PM
I'm a musician, too - former pro. Comments: First, to respond to a comment about Bob Dylan's singing by disparaging his guitar playing - comparing it unfavorably to Leo Kottke's - is at best a non sequitur. Enough about that.
Tom Buckner's explanation of the subleties and techniques in Dylan's singing is right on the money. But most important of all is the emotion he conveys. Dylan is a highly expressive singer, which is one reason why his singing resonates so well.
Not with everyone, obviously - which leads us to another point: Response to singing is highly personal. But a comparison of Dylan's popularity with Paris Hilton's is fatuous and merits no response.
Re the Hofstadter/Dennett argument against the Chinese Room: I reject it. The person who understands Chinese and prompts the machine is not part of the "system" in an AI program.
The person who understands Chinese is ... the programmer.
Posted by: RJ Eskow | Dec 14, 2009 8:57:51 PM
Anyone who thinks Dylan can't sing or write venturing an opinion on a Turing Test thread is the very essence of irony.
Posted by: Carlos | Dec 14, 2009 9:26:17 PM
fyngyrz, this is conceptual, right? You are slighting Dylan's musicianship and his poetry as a way of suggesting speech and cognition are possible in the absence of real understanding and insight. Okay, I get it. You can pass the Turing Test while -- inferentially, now -- digging Liberace. This is genius. You are showing how a computer programmed for musical literacy will still not get Dylan the way a program for normal speech will disallow koans. I like it. Your point is made.
Either that, or Carlos is right, again.
Posted by: Elatia Harris | Dec 14, 2009 10:24:56 PM
I'm willing to accept that Dylan is better than Tom Waits, but then I quite like Waits.
Anyway, we run into the issue of prerecording with a singing Turing Test. After all, my CD player is a machine that can sing to me very well, but isn't sentient.
The whole point about a Turing Test is that one may poke the subject to see its intelligence. How about a Turing Test where one comments on blog posts?
Posted by: Sagredo | Dec 14, 2009 11:25:32 PM
O, I'd not slight either Waits or Dylan for singing, nor Kottke either for his stringular prowess!
But, re the Chinese room: I understood the systems objection to mean that the system as a whole, if it can sustain an intelligent Chinese conversation, understands Chinese; the system as a whole, not any part of it! Even the human moving pieces of paper around in it is better viewed as a functional demon, not as an independent mind. (That person isn't supposed to understand Chinese at all. The human in the room is a red herring. Figuratively, of course.)
The systems view is upheld by recent research into human consciousness, such as in the recent Stanislas Dehaene talke "Signatures Of Consciousness," here: http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dehaene09/dehaene09_index.html
Consciousness in the human brain happens when lots of different areas are all 'talking' to each other at once. They can all be busy but you'll be unconscious if they're not in concert. We need to decide whether we want a Turing test pass to mean there's a *conscious* being. I mean it that way. An expert system that can keep giving me sensible answers is one thing, but somehow I would feel it wasn't quite passing the Turing test unless it was in some sense conscious too.
It seems to me that a Chinese room could pass (in my estimation, at least), IF I thought it was fully emulating every mode of thought I deemed essential to a real mind. But I'm finding myself puzzled when I try to say how closely it would need to model a mind like mine. It's the old fallacy of the beard... one hair isn't a beard, nor are two... but if you keep adding whiskers, eventually you can call it a beard without expecting to be contradicted, and that's what I assume Turing meant: now that it can do 999 things our brains can do, we call it a thinking machine without expecting to be contradicted. But perhaps 1000 was the magic number? But still, that's my read on the Chinese room: can we have enough modules interacting so that it's only substrate chauvinism to say it's not really thinking? Or will we find that the only way to make something that really thinks is to make it out of proteins and goop anyway?
But hey, I think we're all really patterns of probability wiggles in some sort of Platonic mathematical cloud anyway.
Thanks for posting this article, Mr. Eskow. For some reason, this mixture of golems and Dylan and Turing lifts my spirits.
Posted by: Tom Buckner | Dec 15, 2009 12:32:25 AM
But a Turing Test is intended to discern intelligence (or "intelligence"), not emotion. We already know that computers can emote, or at least my laptop can.
I love Dylan's guitar playing, especially on those first few albums. Deceptively simple, very rhythmic and hypnotic. Nothing more than it should be. I saw John Williams a few years ago, at the CSO, playing Malian blues off sheet music--he was stiff as aboard. Technique isn't everything.
Posted by: Chris Schoen | Dec 15, 2009 12:36:16 AM
But, c’mon! We’ve also got 24,909 tunes on our iPods! We’ve got Trundled Duck Confit with a Gorgonzola Reduction! We’ve got shamanic excursions into the heart of the Andes! We’ve got that new James Cameron movie coming out! In 3-fucking-D! Surely it all balances out? Surely, surely, this all counts for something? I mean, you can’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs, right? And the upholstery in this ’66 Thunderbird is just luscious, isn’t it?
I totally agree with you Carlos.
Posted by: Dave Ranning | Dec 15, 2009 1:31:05 AM
Gee. I hope anyone who ventures the Dylan > Waits hypothesis keeps the utter, utter awfulness of this in mind:
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/notion/505907/bob_dylan_s_christmas_album_is_this_a_joke
Posted by: Nick Smyth | Dec 15, 2009 2:16:01 AM
Delighted to lift your spirits, Mr. B. And what a great set of comments, all.
Re Dylan, the Christmas album proves my point - that sincerity imbues singing with power. It may be "bad," but in its very badness it conveys ... ah, the hell with it.
Re Dylan v. Waits, we have set up a false polarity. The two exist entirely independently of one one another. That said - while I'm a huge admirer of Waits' writing, I've always found his hipster/nighthawk singing style mannered and off-putting. Interesting - I react negatively to it because it feels insincere, which WAS my point ...
Your beard analogy is interesting. However, if a machine is pre-programmed for every (or virtually all) possible language interactions, that is not the same as a mind learning and using language. If so, then we should be having a debate about whether the "Speak and Spell" toys of our childhood should be given full civil rights.
Best, R
Posted by: RJ Eskow | Dec 15, 2009 9:21:18 AM
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