January 30, 2009
Liberals and Libertarians: Kissing Cousins or Distant Relatives?
Joshua Cohen discusses in Boston Review:
“Liberals and Libertarians: Kissing Cousins or Distant Relatives?” That question was debated at a January 13 event sponsored by Stanford University's Program in Ethics in Society and the Cato Institute. Boston Review co-editor Joshua Cohen gave these comments.
In his book Political Liberalism, John Rawls offers a general description of a liberal political outlook. He intends the description to cover views ranging from the classical liberalism of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, arguably in the tradition of Locke and Adam Smith, to the more egalitarian liberalism of his own Theory of Justice. Rawls writes, “the content of a liberal political conception of justice is given by three main features:
1. a specification of basic rights, liberties and opportunities (of a kind familiar from constitutional democratic regimes);
2. an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties and opportunities, especially with respect of claims of the general good and perfectionist values; and
3. measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties and opportunities.
These [three] elements can be understood in different ways, so that there are many variant liberalisms.”
Aren’t these just the typically vacuous abstractions that only a philosopher could love? No. Quite to the contrary, Rawls here identifies the common ground shared by classical and egalitarian liberals. And, I think, the common ground occupied by the participants in this discussion.
The abstract description of shared ground is located at the level of principle, not policy, but it is not vacuous at all, and in two important ways.
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Comments
The big flaw in Rawls's philosopphy, in my opinion is that his so-called "difference principle" -- which concentrates on the least well-off -- not only does not lead to a well-ordered ranking of possible social choices but in fact justifies ignoring the broad middle-class; which is exactly what happened, of course.
On the other hand, Nozick's libertarianism also suffers a fatal flaw: he acknowledged the need to rectify prior injustices in the initial distribution of resources, but did not realize how big an exception that was. History shows that capital is a kind of stored servitude; it is the accumulated crime and sacrifice of centuries. Therefore redistributive justice that is not economically inefficient -- a big if -- would be fully justified.
Bottom line: the greatest good of the greatest number still stands as the one and only criterion of a just society. At least I think so.
Posted by: Luke Lea | Jan 31, 2009 12:10:01 PM
Correction: I should have said that capital is the accumulated crime and sacrifice of centuries, plus interest. All three of these components are equally important, and have to be taken into account. Honest businessment are a key part of the mix.
Posted by: Luke Lea | Jan 31, 2009 12:13:37 PM
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